The Income Tax Effect Of Mortgages by Drye,, John W., Jr.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 2
Spring 3-1-1960
The Income Tax Effect Of Mortgages
John W. Drye, Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John W. Drye, Jr., The Income Tax Effect Of Mortgages, 17 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1 (1960),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol17/iss1/2
Washington and Lee Law Review
Member of the Southern Law Review Conference
Volume XVII Spring i96o Number 1
THE INCOME TAX EFFECT OF MORTGAGES
JOHN W. DRYE, JR.*
Real estate is often referred to as a tax sheltered type of busi-
ness, and the possibilities of tax underwritten gains from investments
therein are well recognized; but very little seems to have been writ-
ten as to how this all came about. Aside from the benefit of the
capital gains tax, the impact of the income tax on real estate opera-
tions is mainly reduced by the deductions for property taxes, interest,
expenses of operations, and depreciation. The first three of these de-
ductions involve cash payments by the taxpayer and certainly do not
artificially enrich him.
Depreciation, however, is a different matter; it involves a reduc-
tion in taxable income without a current diminution of the cash in-
flow. So long as depreciation reasonably measures the gradtial re-
duction in the useful life of a wasting asset and is computed on the
taxpayer's real investment in the property, fairness requires the de-
duction. But when depreciation begins to be computed on a much
higher base than the real investment of the owner, the tax shelter
comes into being. A mortgage on property can produce this shelter.
This seemingly artificial result does not spring (as depletion, for
example) from any specific statutory expression of congressional in-
tent; it has been developed in the case law. Mortgages also consider-
ably affect tax computations other than of depredation.
The important basic law on the effect of mortgages on real estate
transactions stems from the reasoning adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Crane v. Commissioner.' In that case Mrs. Crane
had inherited real estate from her husband, on which there existed at
his death a mortgage of $255,ooo, plus accrued interest of $7,o42.50,
making a total of $262,o042.5o. The property was reported at that
*Senior partner, Kelley, Drye, Newhall & Maginnes, New York City.
1331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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value in his estate tax return and a deduction taken for the debt in
the same amount. The reported figures were accepted by the Com-
missioner on audit of the return. During the seven years she held the
property the allowable depreciation was computed at $28,o45.1o. She
sold the property, subject to the mortgage which she had not as-
sumed, for $3,ooo. The expenses of sale were $500. She reported in her
return a gain of $2,500. The Commissioner contended that the un-
adjusted basis of the property was $262,042.50, which should be ad-
justed for depreciation of $28,045.1o, and that the gain should be
computed by considering the amount realized on the sale as not only
the $2,5oo net cash received, but also the principal amount of the
mortgage.
The Court sustained the Commissioner's contention by these suc-
cessive steps. It held that "property" acquired by Mrs. Crane, as de-
fined in the statute, constituted the whole property and not the equity,
that depreciation was to be computed on the whole value of the
building on the property unreduced on account of the mortgage, and
that on the sale of the property she received the amount of the mort-
gage despite the fact that she was not relieved of any personal liability.
Practical considerations, so called, seem to have swayed the Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, writing the opinion of the Court, said:
"Under these provisions, if the mortgagor's equity were the
Sec. 113(a) basis, it would also be the original basis from which
depreciation allowances are deducted. If it is, and if the amount
of the annual allowances were to be computed on that value,
as would then seem to be required, they will represent only a
fraction of the cost of the corresponding physical exhaustion.
and any recoupment by the mortgagor of the remainder of that
cost can be effected only by the reduction of his taxable gain
in the year of sale. If, however, the amount of the annual allow-
ances were to be computed on the value of the property, and
then deducted from an equity basis, we would in some instances
have to accept deductions from a minus basis or deny deduc-
tions altogether. The Commissioner also argues that taking the
mortgagor's equity as the Sec. zi3(a) basis would require the
basis to be changed with each payment on the mortgage, and
that the attendant problem of repeatedly recomputing basis and
annual allowances would be a tremendous accounting burden
on both the Commissioner and the taxpayer. Moreover, the
mortgagor would acquire control over the timing of his depre-
ciation allowances.
"Thus it appears that the applicable provisions of the Act
expressly preclude an equity basis, and the use of it is contrary
to certain implicit principles of income tax depreciation, and
entails very great administrative difficulties.2
2Id. at 9.
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"We are rather concerned with the reality that an owner of
property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the
property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the
mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations."3
It is not surprising that Judge Magruder, Chief Judge of the First
Circuit, later commented in Parker v. Delaney:
"As an original matter, I would have had some difficulty in
understanding how the taxpayer in the Crane case realized more
than $3,ooo from her sale of the mortgaged property there
involved .... 4
With the holdings of the Crane case in mind, let us examine some
of the tax results of the use of mortgages.
Basis and Depreciation of Mortgaged Real Estate
When financing is required in connection with the acquisition of
real estate, it is generally accomplished through the use of a mortgage
in one of three ways: (1) the purchaser borrows funds from a lendef,
giving as security a mortgage on the property and uses the borrowed
funds to meet the purchase price; (2) the vendor accepts a purchase
money mortgage; or (3) the purchaser assumes, or takes subject to, a
pre-existing mortgage. In each of these cases the purchaser may or
may not be obligated on the mortgage debt. The use of a dummy on
such obligations has become quite general.
In the first situation described above, the taxpayer's basis under
section 1o125 is the amount of cash paid for the property. In the second
and third situations described above, while neither the Internal Rev-
enue Code nor the Regulations specifically so provide, it appears to be
well settled, since the decision in the Crane case, that the basis of the
property is the amount of cash paid plus the amount of the mortgage
debt, whether or not the purchaser is personally liable on the mortgage
debt.6 The taxpayer's basis for depreciation accordingly will include
the amount of the mortgage debt. Futhermore, even though the
mortgage debt is later discharged, while the taxpayer owns the prop-
erty, at less than its face amount, depreciation for years prior to such
discharge will remain unaffected.7
3Id. at 14.
'i86 F.2d 455, 459 (ist Cir. 195o), cert. denied, 341 US. 926 (1951).
5All section references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the
Regulations thereunder unless otherwise indicated.
Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (ist Cir. 1950), cert denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951);
Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T.C. 8oi (1949), acq., 1949-2 Cum. Bull. 1.
7Blackstone Theatre Co., supra note 6.
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Sale of Mortgaged Real Estate
Upon the sale of mortgaged property, the amount realized under
section iooi will include the face amount of the mortgage debt,
whether or not the taxpayer is personally liable thereon, at least when
the value of the property at the time of sale equals or exceeds the
mortgage debt.8 When, however, the taxpayer is not personally liable
on the mortgage debt and at the time of disposition the mortgage
debt exceeds the value of the property, the rule may be different. The
Supreme Court in the Crane case observed:
"Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the
amount of the mortgage, the mortgagor who is not personally
liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Conse-
quently a different problem might be encountered where a mort-
gagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the
mortgage without receiving boot." 9
Apparently the Court believed that in such a case the amount
realized by the taxpayer would be the value of the property trans-
ferred. However, if the amount realized is to be so limited, the tax-
payer may receive substantial undeserved tax benefits. For example,
assume that X purchases vacant land for $5,ooo in cash and takes sub-
ject to but does not assume a pre-existing mortgage in the amount of
$25,ooo. His basis thus becomes $3o,ooo. Assume further that the
property falls in value to $i5,ooo and is sold at foreclosure for that
amount. Under the Crane dictum X would apparently have a tax
loss of $15,ooo, contrasted with an actual loss of $5,000.
To illustrate further the results that may follow from such a rule,
assume the same facts except that the property purchased was a de-
preciable building and that X's adjusted basis was $12,000 when the
mortgage was foreclosed. If the amount realized by X is to be limited
to the value of the property ($15,oo), X would have a recognized
gain of $3,ooo, would have taken $i8,ooo in depreciation deductions,
and would have been out-of-pocket only $5,ooo-again a completely ar-
tificial result.
To follow the Crane dictum and still avoid these tax windfalls
it would be necssary to require the taxpayer, upon foreclosure or
other disposition of property which has fallen in value below the
amount of the mortgage, to reduce its adjusted basis by the excess
of the mortgage debt over value. There seems to be no authority or
80rane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (lst
Cir. 195o).
933, U.S. at 14 n.37.
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logical reason for adjusting basis to dovetail with sales price. "In
addition, if this approach were possible, it would result in many in-
stances in a negative basis, a concept which has not been accepted.10
So long as the basis principle of the Crane case remains the law,
it would seem that the dictum should be ignored and the rule extend-
ed all the way to require the seller to include as the amount realized
on disposition of the property the amount of the mortgage debt unre-
duced by the excess of the debt over actual value. This does not seem
to produce an unfair result, so long as the mortgage is included in the
computation of basis as well as in the amount realized on disposition.
Three Tax Court cases"' have reached this result; however, each case
involved a mortgage -incurred subsequent to the purchase of the prop-
erty by the seller or his transferor in a tax-free exchange. Thus, the
taxpayer or his transferor in each case had in fact received the proceeds
of the mortgage. This fact may be a logical, but it is not a practical,
ground of distinction.
Of course, adoption of a rule of law that the mortgagor always
realizes the amount of the mortgage when the property is sold or
foreclosed will result in hardship in some instances.12 The profit
resulting from adjustment of basis due to allowable depreciation
may be taxed at a rate differing from the average rate reductions
obtained from depreciation. Much will depend on the tax brackets of
the taxpayer over the period of ownership. Such possibilities seem to
be more of the "rub of the green" type of result. They should be
ignored in the interest of providing a consistent basis for depredation.
Discharge of Mortgage Debt at Less Than Face Amount When
Mortgagor Retains the Property
When the value of property has decreased below the amount
of the mortgage debt and the mortgagor and mortgagee agree upon
a partial discharge of the mortgage, does the mortgagor receive income
from the discharge of indebtedness? Adjustments of this character
were not uncommon during the depression.
0'rhe Tax Court rejected such a theory in its opinion in the Crane case, 3 T.C.
585 (1944), holding that when the basis of property reached zero no further adjust-
ments can be made. See the concurring opinion in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455
(ist Cir. 195o), for a discussion of negative basis.
"Lutz & Schramm Co., i T.C. 682 (1943), nonacq., 1943 Cum. Bull. 35; Mend-
ham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Woodsam Associates, Inc., 16 T.C. 649 (1941), aff'd,
198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 952).
12Witness the Crane case wherein the taxpayer's benefit from depreciation deduc-
tions was approximately $15o, while she incurred a tax of $i,9oo.
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When a solvent owner is personally liable on a mortgage, it would
seem that he would realize income in an amount equal to the amount
of indebtedness cancelled. Some courts, however, have held that a
mortgagor personally liable on the mortgage, does not realize cancel-
lation of indebtedness income when, through negotiation with the
mortgagee, part of the mortgage debt is cancelled and at the time the
fair market value has fallen below the amount of the mortgage by an
amount at least equal to the amount of the debt cancelled.13 The
amount of the cancellation is instead treated as a reduction of the
purchase price. The Second Circuit, however, has viewed this dis-
tinction as "irrational" and, if valid, limited to a case wherein the
vendor-mortgagee, in negotiations relating directly to the purchase
price, agrees to a reduction. 14 The Tax Court apparently limits the
rule to agreements between the mortgagor and the vendor-mortgagee. 15
It has been held, however, that no income is realized from the cancella-
tion of an unassumed indebtedness. 6
Section io8, enacted since these cases were decided, provides that-
"No amount shall be included in gross income by reason of
the discharge, in whole or in part, within the taxable year, of
any indebtedness for which the taxpayer is liable, or subject to
which the taxpayer holds property, if
(i) the indebtedness was incurred or assumed-
(A) by a corporation, or
(B) by an individual in connection with property used
in his trade or business, and..."
the taxpayer files the necessary consent to adjustment in basis.
While the converse of this section would seem to be that income
will be recognized to these named types of solvent taxpayers if the
consent is not filed, the Senate Report on the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 indicates that section io8 was not intended to have a negative
pregnant effect. In speaking of the deletion by the Senate of section 76
of the House bill, which would have dealt with the inclusion of income
from the discharge of indebtedness; the report 7 states:
"Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1945); Helvering v. A. L. Killian
Co., 178 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940);
Hextell v. Huston, 28 F. Supp. 521, appeal dismissed, 1o7 F.2d io16 (8th Cir. 1939).
"4Fifth Ave.-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1944).
nsDenman Tire & Rubber Co., 14 T.C. 7o6 (195o), aff'd, 192 F.2d 261 (6th Cir.
1951).
6Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (i94o), acq., 194o-2 Cum. Bull. 4; Fulton Gold
Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934); American Seating Co., 14 B.T.A. 328 (1928), aff'd and
rev'd on other issues, 5o F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1931). This exception was recognized by
the court in the Fifth Ave.-Fourteenth St. Corp. case, 147 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. i94).
1TS. Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954).
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"Deletion of this section will leave the situation as it now exists,
with the determination as to whether cancellation results in in-
come to the debtor, and to what extent, to be settled according
to the rules developed by the courts."
The result then would appear to be that the statute, subject to filing
the necessary consent, assures the benefit of the favorable cases dis-
cussed above to taxpayers who find the filing of the consent desirable.
"An individual" whose property is not "used in his trade or business"
will still find vitality in these decisions, as the Senate Report indicates.
Foreclosures, Conveyances to Mortgagee, and Abandonments-
Capital or Ordinaiy Income or Loss
Foreclosure sales of real estate have been held to give rise to
capital gain or loss, not ordinary gain or loss, irrespective of whether
the taxpayer owner is or is not personally liable on the mortgage
debt.' s The cases involving voluntary conveyances of mortgaged real
estate to the mortgagee or abandonments by the mortgagor, however,
are indecisive of a specific rule.
In the case of the mortgagor's conveyance of the mortgaged real
estate to the mortgagee and the release by the mortgagee of the mort-
gagor's personal liability on the mortgage debt, it has been held that
the conveyance creates capital loss because the extinguishment of the
debt by the conveyance of the property constitutes an exchange.' 9
When the mortgagor was not personally liable on the mortgage debt,
however, a conveyance of the property to the mortgagee was found to
result in an ordinary loss because the taxpayer, not being personally
liable, received nothing in exchange for the conveyance.2 0 However, a
nominal consideration ($250) passing from the mortgagee to the mort-
gagor converted a disposition into an exchange resulting in capital
loss. 2 1 Similarly, abandonment of property encumbered by an unas-
sumed mortgage produced an ordinary loss when the owner's interest
was worthless.2 2 It has been held, however, that a mortgagor per-
sonally liable on the mortgage debt cannot realize a loss by abandon-
'5 Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1941); Helv-
ering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); Commissioner v. Abramson, 124 F.ad 416
(2d Cir. 1942).
1OPender v. Commissioner, 1o F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 31o U.S.
650 (1940); Rogers v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 3o8
U.S. 58o (1939).
2Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.9d 335 (3 d Cir. 1941).
"Blum v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1943).
2Commissioner v. Hoffman, 117 F.ad 987 (2d Cir. 1941); Polin v. Commissioner,
114 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940).
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ment (and thereby an ordinary loss) when the abandonment is fol-
lowed by a foreclosure sale because until the foreclosure sale the
property continues to have some value which bears directly on the
determination of the amount of the deficiency judgment against the
mortgagor.
2a
The converse of these cases, 24 holding that an unobligated mort-
gagor realizes an ordinary loss on deeding the property to the mort-
gagee, would seem to be that if a gain results the gain would like-
wise be ordinary. However, in Lutz & Schramm Co. 25 the Tax Court
spoke of the taxpayer's gain as being capital gain. A ground for
distinguishing this case may be that as the taxpayer had actually
received the mortgage proceeds by mortgaging the property after ac-
quiring it, there was an element of exchange present.
There seems to be no reasonable basis, however, for treating the
loss or gain to the obligated mQrtgagor as a capital loss or gain while
at the same time giving the unobligated owner the opportunity to
select the result. Perhaps this opportunity no longer exists. If the
doctrine of the Crane case, which was decided after these distinctions
were recognized, is applicable, does not the owner of mortgaged pro-
perty who has no personal liability on the mortgage "receive" the
amount of the mortgage (at least to the extent of the value of the
property) on an abandonment or voluntary transfer?
Section 1231, furthermore, would allow the obligated mortgagor
to treat a loss incurred on a transfer of business property to the mort-
gagee in extinguishment of the debt as an ordinary loss, provided the
mortgagor does not have gains from the sale or exchange of business
property or from the involuntary conversion of capital or business
assets in excess of such loss. Of course, if in applying section 1231 an
overall gain results, the loss suffered on the mortgaged property will
have the limited tax effect of a capital loss. Section 1231 may not apply
in the case of the unobligated mortgagor if no sale is involved.
An interesting aspect of the problem of the "amount realized" is
how the tax shall be computed on a foreclosure sale when the mort-
gage debt is in excess of the value of the property, but the value of the
property is in excess of the adjusted basis. Assuming that the prop-
erty is not held for sale to customers in the regular course of business,
would it be logical to treat the difference between the adjusted basis
and market value as capital gain and the excess of indebtedness can-
"Commissioner v. Green, 126 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1942).
"See notes 2o and 22 supra, and Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (ist Cir. 1950).
2Lutz & Schramm Co., i T.C. 682 (1943).
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celled over value as cancellation of indebtedness income-i.e., ordinary
income? When the market value of the property was less than basis
and the indebtedness cancelled exceeded the basis, the cases26 treated
the transaction not from the viewpoint of an elimination of indebted-
ness, but from the viewpoint of gain on the disposition of property.
It would appear, therefore, that when basis is less than value and
value less than the mortgage debt, the entire transaction will give
rise only to capital gain.
Transfers of Mortgaged Real Estate in Corporate Organizations
and Reorganizations
The Code permits certain exchanges in connection with corporate
organizations and reorganizations to be made tax-free. However, sec-
tion 357 (c) provides:
"(1) In general-In the case of an exchange-
(A) to which section 351 applies, or
(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of
reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(D),
if the sum of the amount of liabilities assumed, plus the
amount of the liabilities to which the property is subject,
exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property transfer-
red pursuant to such exchange, then such excess shall be con-
sidered as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or
of property which is not a capital asset, as the case may be."
Thus, regardless of whether or not the transferee-corporation in
these instances obligates itself on the mortgage or merely takes sub-
ject to it, gain is recognized to the transferor to the extent of the
excess of the mortgage over his basis.
For example, assume that X purchases Blackacre for $1,ooo in cash
and takes subject to a pre-existing mortgage of $ig,ooo. He holds the
property for a number of years and takes $5,ooo in depreciation, so
that his original basis of $20,000 is adjusted to $15,ooo. X then trans-
fers Blackacre to a corporation in a section 351 transfer when the
mortgage debt has been reduced to $18,ooo. X will have a recognized
capital gain (assuming Blackacre is a capital asset) of $3,ooo, the
excess of the mortgage over his basis. The corporation, of course, will
get a stepped-up basis of $i8,ooo under section 362.
In all cases under the reorganization sections the amount of the
mortgage existing at the time of transfer is deemed to be realized, al-
though in cases to which section 357(c) does not apply, the tax is
• Ibid.; Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 32o (1947).
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deferred by an adjustment to basis. This adjustment is required by
section 3 5 8(d) which applies when "another party to the exchange
... acquired from the taxpayer property subject to a liability .... "
Thus in the case above, X's basis for his stock will be zero, com-
puted by adding to his basis of $i5,ooo the amount of the gain recog-
nized on the exchange of $3,ooo and then reducing this $18,ooo figure
by $18,ooo, the amount of the liability to which the property was sub-
ject at the time of the transfer.
On the other hand, if X had also transferred to the corporation
Greenacre, an unencumbered parcel worth $io,ooo with an adjusted
basis of $5,ooo, the property transferred would have had an aggregate
basis of $2o,ooo. As the debt would have been less than basis, no gain
would be recognized under section 357(c). However, because of section
3 5 8(d) the basis for his stock would be the basis of the property
transferred, $20,000, less the mortgage indebtedness of $18,ooo, or
$2,000.
Thus, in the reorganization sections of the Internal Revenue Code
Congress has carefully provided that the amount of any mortgage en-
cumbering property transferred pursuant to a corporate organization
or reorganization is to be realized, whether or not the transferor is
personally liable on the mortgage debt, although recognition of the
gain realized is delayed in some instances until disposition of the
stock received. These provisions are thus consistent with the rule of
the Crane case.
Involuntary Conversions under Section 1033
In regard to pre-1951 involuntary conversions of property into
money, section 1033(a)(2) provides generally that no gain shall be
recognized if the "money" into which the property was converted is
expended in the acquisition of similar property, but to the extent that
the money is not so expended gain shall be recognized. In regard to
post-1950 involuntary conversions, section 1o33(a)(3) provides that
the gain shall be recognized to the extent that the "amount realized"
upon the conversion exceeds the cost of similar property purchased for
the purpose of replacing the converted property.
The Regulations27 provide, futhermore, in regard to both pre-1951
and post-1950 conversions that, if the converted property is encum-
bered by a mortgage and in a condemnation proceeding the Govern-
ment pays off the mortgagee directly, the amount so paid the mortgagee
2Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1o33(a)-2(c)(1o), 1o33(a)-3(d).
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is considered part of the "money" into which the property was convert-
ed or part of the "amount realized," whether or not the taxpayer was
personally liable on the mortgage.
The use of the term "amount realized" in section 1033(a)(3) in
contrast with the word "money" in section 1o33(a)(2) and the
separate treatment in section 1033 of transfers before and after 195o
indicates that the former term was carefully selected with an eye to the
Crane decision and that the Regulations correctly interpret the law,
at least as to conversions after 195o.
With regard to pre-1951 conversions, the new Regulations may not
correctly interpret the law. The Regulations28 under the 1939 Code,
while providing generally for the same treatment of mortgages en-
cumbering the property as the new Regulations do, did not mention
that they were applicable to both assumed and unassumed mortgages.
Moreover, three cases29 involving section 112(f) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939 [the former, version of section 1O33(a)(2)] have
come to conflicting conclusions as to whether the owner who is not
personally liable on the mortgage debt receives "money" equal to the
full amount of the award or merely the net amount of the award after
the direct payment by the Government of the mortgage.
All three cases involved similar facts. The taxpayer owned mort-
gaged real estate and was not personally liable on the mortgage; the
Government condemned the property and paid off the mortgage
directly out of the award, giving the taxpayer only the net amount of
the award. The Second Circuit in the Fortee case30 held that "proper-
ty" in section i 12(f) of the 1939 Code meant the physical property, not
the taxpayer's equity in the property. Relying on the Crane case, the
court reasoned that the taxpayer must treat the payment to the mort-
gagee by the Government as if the taxpayer himself had received the
award and then paid off the mortgage. The court concluded that the
taxpayer's realized gain must be recognized to the extent of the amount
paid the mortgagee. The taxpayer had invested not only the net
award received by him but also an additional $2,ooo as well from his
own funds, but the court did not decide whether the recognized gain
should be reduced to the extent of such $2,000.
The Ninth Circuit in the Babcock case 1 held that "property" in
23Treas. Reg. iii § 29 .112(t)-.
2Commissioner v. Babcock, 259 F.2d 689 (gth Cir. 1958); Commissioner v.
Fortee Properties, Inc., 121 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1954); Wala Garage, Inc. v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. C1. 1958).
3'Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., supra note 29.
mCommissioner v. Babcock, supra note 29.
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section 112(f) of the 1939 Code can be less than complete legal and
equitable title, that the purpose of the section was to aid the taxpayer,
and that the section is satisfied as long as the net award received by the
taxpayer is invested in similar property.
The Court of Claims' decision in the Wala Garage case 2 followed
the Fortee case, but extended it to hold that so long as the taxpayer
puts up sufficient money (even though derived from a source other than
the award) to cover part or all of the amount of the award given to the
mortgagee, the section is satisfied and no gain is recognized to the tax-
payer to the extent of the additional sums put up by the taxpayer.
The Tax Court aligns itself with the Ninth Circuit; it had held in
favor of the taxpayer in the Fortee case33 and also in the Babcock
case.3
4
Transfers of Like Property under Section o3i
Section 1o31 allows a taxpayer to exchange, without the recogni-
tion of gain or loss, property held for productive use in trade or busi-
ness or for investment, for like property to be so held. If, however, the
property transferred is encumbered by a mortgage, the amount of the
mortgage debt is treated under section 1031(d) as money received on
the exchange, whether the transferee assumes the mortgage debt or
merely takes subject to the mortgage debt, and under section io 3 i(b)
gain, if any, is recognized, but not in excess of the amount of the mort-
gage debt.
When both the property transferred and the property received are
encumbered by mortgages, Regulation section 1.1031(b)-l(c) provides
that the mortgages shall be offset against each other. In such a case,
therefore, the party transferring the property encumbered by the small-
er mortgage will not be treated as receiving "money" under section
103 1(d), and accordingly no gain will be recognized to such party un-
der section io 3 i(b). The other party's gain will be recognized, but only
to the extent of the excess of the mortgage on the property transferred
over the amount of the mortgage on the property received.
While the transfer of property encumbered by a mortgage will
result in the recognition of gain under section io31(b) if the property
is transferred for unencumbered property or for property encumbered
by a mortgage less than the mortgage encumbering the transferred
property, section io31(c) provides that if a loss results on the transfer
the loss will not be recognized.
'Wala Garage, Inc. v. United States, supra note 29.
"Fortee Properties, Inc., 19 T.C. -99 (1952).
"Frank W. Babcock, 28 T.C. 781 (1957).
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Transfer of Mortgaged Real Estate to Charities
Regulation section 1.170-1(c) provides that if a charitable contribu-
tion is made in property other than money, the amount of the contri-
bution is determined? by the fair market value of the property at the
time of the contribution. The taxpayer, furthermore, does not have to
include in gross income the excess of fair market value over the ad-
justed basis of the property.3  As is well known, these rules usually
make it advantageous to a taxpayer to give appreciated property to
charity instead of cashing in on the value of the property and giving
the proceeds to charity.
When the property transferred is encumbered by a mortgage
and the property value exceeds the amount of the mortgage, the chari-
table deduction will be equal to the taxpayer's net equity in the prop-
erty.
The question that apparently has not been passed upon by the
case law or the Revenue Service in any published ruling is whether
or not the mortgagor "realizes" the amount of the mortgage on such
a gift. Section iooi provides for the computation of the gain or loss
from "the sale or other disposition of property." The word "disposi-
tion" would seem to be broad enough to include a transfer by gift.36
In Lutz & Schramm Co.37 and Woodsam Associates, Inc. 3s it was held
that while the mortgaging of previously acquired property is not a
taxable event, the taxpayer must account for the amount of the mort-
gage debt when transferring the property even though not personally
liable on it. Accordingly, if a gift of mortgaged property is con-
templated, the probability that the amount of the mortgage may be
"received" should be taken into account in computing the tax benefits
from the proposed gift. The Research Institute of America reports the
unofficial position of the Commissioner to be that a transfer of encum-
bered property to a charity results in the realization of "income" to
the extent the mortgage debt exceeds the property's basis.
For example, assume that X owns Blackacre valued at $25,000 with
an adjusted basis of $15,ooo and transfers the property to a charity
after placing an unassumed mortgage on it in the amount of $20,000.
X would clearly have a charitable deduction of $5,ooo; he may also
have a recognized gain of $5,000 on the transfer.
If the mortgage here had been on Blackacre at the time of purchase
%See Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 233.
See Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1943).17Lutz & Schramm Co., i T.C. 682 (1943).
'5Woodsam Associates, Inc., 16 T.C. 649 (195).
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but X had not assumed it, he might nevertheless realize a taxable gain
of $5,ooo. The only difference between this situation and when X
mortgages the property after acquiring it is that in the latter case he
would be, so to speak, required to account for actual money he had
taken out of the property. This may not be a basis for distinction.
The Supreme Court in the Crane case, in holding on a nominal sale
that the "amount realized" included the amount of an unassumed
mortgage, stated:
"We are rather concerned with the reality that an owner of
property mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the prop-
erty will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage
exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he transfers
subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and subs-
tantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another."
39
When the unobligated owner of appreciated mortgaged property
makes a gift of it to charity, the further question is presented as to
whether the gain that may be realized is capital or ordinary. It would
seem from the above quotation from the Crane case that the gain
would be capital. To avoid any uncertainty, it would seem wise for
the taxpayer, who is willing to abandon the contention that no gain at
all is realized upon the gift, to sell the property to the charity for the
amount of the mortgage debt, pay it off, and thereby assure himself of
the benefits of capital gain treatment. a
Perhaps it is fortunate that death has never been considered as
the type of disposition that would bring income tax liabilities into
existence in the absence of specific statutory provision.
Income Tax Considerations for the Mortgagee
Unless and until there is a default in the payments required by the
mortgage, the mortgagee includes the interest received in his taxable
income, but has no other tax worries. Upon the mortgagor's default
the mortgagee can (a) agree to a compromise settlement of the mort-
gage debt, (b) accept a deed to the property in lieu of the foreclosure, or
(c) foreclose on the property.
Bad Debt Deduction Versus Capital Loss
The following discussion is limited to the cases in which the mort-
gage notes are not "securities" within the meaning of section
165(g)(2).
333- U.S. at 14.
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If the mortgagee and mortgagor make a bona fide agreement
to extinguish the mortgage debt completely because of the mortgagor's
inability to meet his obligation, and the basis of the indebtedness can-
celled exceeds the amount of cash or value of the property received by
the mortgagee in consideration thereof, the mortgagee is entitled to
a bad debt deduction under section 166 for such excess. If, under the
same circumstances, the mortgagee accepts a deed to the property in
lieu of foreclosure and extinguishes the debt in consideration thereof,
the result will be the same.40
On a foreclosure sale the mortgagee may either bid in the property
himself or allow it to be bid in by a third party. In the latter instance
he will apply the bid price against the mortgage debt and, if practical,
proceed against the mortgagor for the remainder. If the remaining debt
is uncollectible, the mortgagee will be entitled to a bad debt deduction
under section 166.41 If the mortgagee himself bids in the property
for less than the debt, applying the mortgagor's notes against the bid
price, and the portion of the indebtedness remaining unsatisfied after
the sale is uncollectible, the mortgagee again is entitled to a bad debt
deduction under section 166.42 The amount of the deduction is de-
pendent upon the mortgagee's basis for the debt.
43
If the mortgagee is an individual and the debt represents a non-
business debt, the loss arising from the worthlessness of the debt will
be treated as a short-term capital loss under section 166(d). What
constitutes a business debt is a question of fact.
In addition to sustaining a deductible bad debt loss upon his bid-
ding in of the property at a foreclosure sale, the mortgagee may also
realize gain or loss on the transaction.4 4 The amount of the gain or
loss will be the difference between the fair value of the property and
the basis of those obligations of the debtor which the mortgagee ap-
plies to the bid price.
For example, assume that X sells Blackacre for $15,ooo, receiving
$5,ooo in cash and $io,ooo in the purchaser's notes secured by a mort-
gage in that amount. Assume further that X's basis for the notes is
5io,ooo, that Blackacre falls in value to $5,ooo, and that X bids in
the property for $4,000 upon the mortgagor's default. X applies S4,ooo
"Kohn v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Spreckles,
1o F.2d 517 (gth Cir. 1941); Bingham v. Commissioner, 1o5 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939);
I.T. 3548, 1942-1 Cum. Bull. 74.
41Treas. Reg. § i.i66-6(a).
42Ibid.
4Id. at §§ 166(b), 1.166-1(d).
"Id. at § 1.166-6(b).
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of the mortgagor's notes against the bid price. If the remaining amount
due X is uncollectible, he would have a $6,ooo bad debt deduction. He
would also have a $i,ooo gain under Regulation section 1.166-6(b), be-
ing the excess of the value of the property over the notes applied to
the bid price. Similarly, had X bid in the property for $5,ooo, he
would have had a $5,00o bad debt deduction but no gain.
The Revenue Service takes the position that any such gain or loss
is capital, not ordinary, if the notes are capital assets. 45
Accrued But Unpaid Interest May Be Taxable to the Mortgagee
on Foreclosure
In the Midland Mutual Life Insurance case40 the Supreme Court
found that the mortgagee should be charged with interest income
when his bid equalled the principal and accrued interest on the debt,
even though the value of the property was less than the principal in-
debtedness. The Sixth Circuit, however, refused to follow this case
if an individual taxpayer's bid included unpaid accrued interest,
but the value of the property was less than the principal of the debt.4 7
That Court of Appeals distinguished the case before it from the Mid-
land Mutual case on the ground, among others, that Reg. 77, art. 193
(now Regulation section 1.166-6), applicable to the petitioner but not
to a life insurance company, specifically provided for a deductible loss,
not a receipt of income, when the mortgagee's basis for the indebted-
ness cancelled exceeded the value of the property.
If the value of the property exceeds the principal due on the
mortgage debt, the mortgagee will be charged with any accrued inter-
est due to the extent of the excess of the value of the property over the
principal debt due, whether he acquires the property on foreclosure 4s
or has the property voluntarily deeded to him. 49 When the value of
the property is shown to be less than the principal debt, the mortgagee
will not be charged with accrued interest when the property is volun-
tarily deeded to him or when he bids it in on foreclosure and his bid
price does not include interest due.5 0
"I.T. 3121, 1937--2 Cum. Bull. 138, as modified by I.T. 3548, 1942-1 Cum. Bull.
74; I.T. 3159, 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 188.
"Helvering v. Midland Mutual "Life Ins. Co., 3oo U.S. 216 (1936).
4'Nichols v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1944).
"Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 4 T.C. 811 (1945).
"Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 43 B.T.A. 867 (941).
-" Manhattan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 B.T.A. 1o41 (1938); Helvering v. Midland
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216 (1936).
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Mortgagee's Basis for Property Acquired on Foreclosure
The basis of property acquired by the mortgagee on foreclosure or
by way of a voluntary deed from the mortgagor is its fair market value
when acquired.5' The bid price, however, the Regulations state, is pre-
sumed to be equal to fair market value in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary.
52
Economic Considerations in Mortgaging Real Estate
The most important outgrowth of the Crane case is that it permits
a taxpayer to secure at a relatively low out-of-pocket cost a high depre-
ciation base. Using this device, the investor is able to realize a high
after-tax yield on his investment in the earlier years and later sell out
his interest at capital gains rates.
Numerous examples on various assumptions could be given, but
the following will suffice as a simple illustration.
Let us assume that X, a real estate investor in the 50 per cent tax
bracket, buys property worth $1,oooooo for $20o,ooo in cash and a pur-
chase money mortgage of $8oo,ooo. The mortgage bears interest at 5
per cent and runs for twenty-five years. Payments on the mortgage
amount to $57,ooo a year. A 150 per cent declining balance basis meth-
od of depredation is set for the building valued at $8oo,ooo with an
estimated twenty-five year life. Gross rentals are $145,ooo, and operat-
ing expenses, including property taxes, are $6o,ooo.
In the first year of operation depreciation ($48,000), interest
($40,ooo), and operating expenses ($6o,ooo) would exceed gross ren-
tals by $3,ooo, so that there would be no tax to pay. But the cash out-
lay would be only the payment on the mortgage of $57,00o and operat-
ing expenses of $6o,ooo, or $117,000, leaving $2:8,ooo in cash income.
This is a return of 2.8 per cent on the value of the property, but in
the first year of operation the entire $28,ooo return would be tax-free,
and X would have an after-tax yield of 14 per cent on his investment.
By the eighth year, because of the declining balance method of de-
preciation and because a lesser portion of the $57,000 mortgage pay-
ment would be attributable to interest, the after-tax yield would be
reduced to 5 per cent. At this time X may decide to sell. Assuming the
market value of the property was still $i,ooo,ooo, he would incur a
maximum tax of $78,ooo, but that tax would be attributable to the
depreciation deductions he had theretofore taken and which would
mTreas. Reg. § .166-6(c).
r'Ibid.
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have saved him $156,ooo in taxes at his 50 per cent bracket. Having
sold, he could then reinvest and again take advantage of high de-
preciation rates in the early years.
Another advantage that lies in the use of a mortgage in times of
rising prices is the leverage provided by the debt. For example, assume
that the value of the property, which was worth $20,000 when purchas-
ed for $5,ooo cash and a $15,000 mortgage, increases to $25,000. While
this represents a 25 per cent increase in value, the value of the mort-
gagor's equity is increased from $5,ooo to $io,ooo, or a ioo per cent in-
crease. Of course, the opposite of this is also true-any decrease in value
is also reflected in the mortgagor's equity; thus if the value of the prop-
erty decreases 25 per cent, the mortgagor's equity would be worthless.
However, real estate investors are noted for being incorrigible opti-
mists.
Futhermore, because the mortgaging of property is not a taxable
transaction, 53 the taxpayer can realize on the appreciated value of his
property without incurring any tax. For example, assume that X owns
property worth $50,000 which has an adjusted cost basis of $25,000.
He could mortgage the property for $3o,ooo and thus realize more than
the basis without paying any tax on the transaction.
Conclusion
In the main, the foregoing outlines the steps by which the courts
have raised a tax umbrella over real estate investments. It is doubtful
if they foresaw the ultimate outcome. However, neither Congress nor
the Treasury Department seems to have found fault with it.
MWoodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
